Objective: Self-injurious behaviours (SIBs) are widespread among prisoners and are sometimes classified as potentially calculated acts intended to control others. Access to a psychiatrist may be valued by imprisoned soldiers seeking immediate release from service. The main goal of the study was to assess the effects of a new mental health regulation in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) prison system, which requires ordering an immediate interview with a psychiatrist for inmates performing SIBs.
S uicide attempts and nonfatal SIBs, inflicted with no intent to die, are conceptualized in the literature as serious public health problems with annual rates that have ranged from 2.6 to 1100 per 100 000, with a lifetime prevalence rate of 720 to 5930 per 100 000. 1 SIBs and parasuicide are often used as indicators of suicide risk, 2,3 with a recent systematic review of 90 papers reporting that 15% to 16% will repeat parasuicide at 1 year and 7% will die by suicide within 9 years. 4 In an earlier systematic review, a history of parasuicide increased the risk of suicide to 40 times that of the general population. 5 Prisoner suicide is a significant problem in many countries, with the World Health Organization 6 considering suicide as the most frequent single cause of death in correctional settings-so much so that, in 1999, Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales 7 conducted a thematic review of prisoner suicides rates and found that they had more than doubled between 1982 and 1998 and that the increase was grossly disproportionate to the rise in the prisoner population. A recent large cross-sectional survey of prisoners in England and Wales by the Office of National Statistics 8 found very high rates of parasuicide. Twenty-seven percent of male remand prisoners and 20% of male sentenced prisoners had a history of parasuicide. In Australia, research has consistently shown that suicide is the leading cause of death in Australian prisons, [9] [10] [11] reaching 45% of deaths. 10 In North America, a total of 308 inmates imprisoned in Canadian correctional facilities between 1990 and 1998 committed suicide, 12 while in the United States, Hayes and Rowan 13 reported that the annual rate of suicide by offenders incarcerated in US jails was 9 times higher than the rate of suicide by individuals in the general population.
In a similar vein, a recent study on suicidal behaviour in English and Welsh prisons found that the prevalence of suicidal thoughts in prisoners was greatly increased, compared with individuals living at home. 14 Forty percent of male prisoners and 55% of female prisoners had experienced lifetime suicidal thoughts, compared with 14% of men and 4% of women living at home. The study found that social variables make a significant contribution to a lifetime history of suicidal attempts, namely, the number of stressful life events, lack of social support, small primary support groups, being female, and being young.
In general, the population with SIB (subjects who injure themselves by self-mutilation, for example, by cutting the skin) can be characterized by a relatively young age, 1,15 a history of suicide attempts, substance abuse disorders, loneliness, affective symptoms such as grief and depression, 16, 17 and a history of recent fundamental changes in the individual's social and physical environment. 1, 18 Most persons who cut themselves report the following motivations for their act: anger at themselves or others, relief of tension, or even a wish to die. As stated above, one population at increased risk for SIBs is the prisoner population. 19, 20 Given the increased risk for SIBs and possibly for later death by suicide, the issue of SIBs in prisons is a major concern.
Prisoners who harm themselves are characterized by recent social losses and a lack of social support. 21 Among the causes for SIBs among prisoners, one can find hostility toward others, overwhelming emotional turmoil, protestation against the system, avoidance of adverse situations, need for attention or help, and feelings of deprivation. [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] Most SIBs in prisons are defined by the staff and the prisoners as manipulative. 22, 27 Prisoners use SIBs to avoid adverse aspects of imprisonment, to get help and support, 27 or to be transferred to a more convenient place. From the perspective of lack of support as a causative factor of self-injury, the self-injury results in declining social support in the prison because the prison staff treats self-harming individuals more aggressively, resulting in a vicious cycle.
Owing to the frequency and consequences (such as increased costs and decreased morale) of suicidal behaviours in prisons, we believe that this issue requires further scrutiny with international research. Thus we designed the present study to evaluate the effects of a new regulation on SIB rates and their consequences in the military prison system. In the Israeli military prisons, one of the ways for a young (18 to 21 years) imprisoned soldier under obligatory service to get an early discharge is by obtaining a recommendation for discharge from military service from a military psychiatrist. The act of self-harm appears to be a widespread strategy to gain access to such a pathway and the possibility of discharge it offers. In an attempt to give the best possible treatment to highly distressed inmates, the IDF's mental health department ordered that imprisoned individuals who perform a self-injurious act be given a direct appointment with a psychiatrist. This decision stands in contrast with the previous policy where such inmates were first interviewed by a mental health officer (usually a social worker) who decided whether to refer them to a psychiatrist.
Our study therefore attempted to address possible reasons for the high frequency of suicidal behaviour, namely SIBs, in the prison setting, a setting characterized by high stress, high helplessness, and possibly also high psychopathology. More specifically, our study examines the effect of the abovementioned policy change in mental health assessment on SIBs rates in 2 military prisons.
Method

Data Collection
The military prison system consists of 2 prisons serving different populations: Prison A, intended for inmates sentenced for long periods (usually a few months), and Prison B, intended to house inmates serving short sentences and detained individuals awaiting trial. Prisoners' records from the 2 prisons were collected for the period of 11 months before and 10 months following the implementation of the regulation ordering compulsory appointment with a psychiatrist for inmates performing SIB. The files were screened for frequency of SIBs. SIB severity was defined by the attending physician. SIB consequences (specifically release from service) were examined for 2 months of each period (the 4 months adjacent to the implementation of the regulation). The selection of periods for examination was done after we verified that no other jail policy changes were taken at the time. Thus the studied change can be hypothesized to be the major contributing factor to any possible behavioural change regarding SIBs.
Sample
Data consisted of files of all inmates imprisoned in the 2 prisons during the study period (without sampling). Because most inmates are imprisoned for less than a few weeks, the assumption was that a very low overlap exists between the 2 study groups and therefore they can be treated independently.
Data Analysis
Data for number of inmates and number and rate of suicide attempts were analyzed by means of ANOVA with 2 factors: place (with 2 levels, Prison A and Prison B) and period (with 2 levels, before and after implementation of the regulation). Data for rate of release from military service were analyzed with a chi-square test. Level of significance was set at P < 0.05.
Results
Number of Inmates by Prison per Period
As shown in Table 1 , the mean total number of inmates per month was not different across prisons and across time periods and ranged between 612 and 654 inmates per prison per month (ANOVA: prison effect, ns; period effect, ns; interaction effect, ns). A slight increase in the number of prisoners was found for Prison A, with a parallel decrease in Prison B inmates, but this was not significant.
Number and Rates of SIBs
As shown in Table 1 , the number of SIBs was significantly higher after the change of regulation, compared with the previous period, but the increase was limited to Prison B (an increase in means from 2.7 to 6.2 SIBs per month) and did not Presented as ratio of number of discharged SIB soldiers out of the total number of discharged subjects due to psychiatric reasons occur in Prison A (ANOVA: prison effect F 1,38 = 9.490552, P < 0.004; period effect F 1,38 = 7.605197, P < 0.009; interaction effect F 1,38 = 4.737122, P < 0.04).
As shown in Table 1 , this change is also reflected in the mean SIB rates standardized by inmates' numbers. In Table 1 , the change was found significant for Prison B only (ANOVA: prison effect F 1,38 = 9.138, P < 0.005; period effect F 1,38 = 7.364, P < 0.01; interaction effect F 1,38 = 6.165, P < 0.02).
Severity of Injuries
The injuries were rated by the treating physician according to the following scale: a minor injury was considered as a slight body injury requiring minor medical treatment, whereas a moderate injury was considered as one requiring serious medical treatment or hospitalization in a general medical hospital. Finally, a severe injury was considered as one endangering life. Severity of injuries for nearly all SIBs across prisons and periods was defined "minor," except for one case during the second period that was defined moderate. There was no difference between the 2 prisons and between the 2 periods in the preferred methods used by the inmates for the SIBs (data not shown).
Rates of Discharge From the Military by Prison per Period
Discharge from the military is one of the prisms through which the mental health department and the IDF evaluate tendencies, efficacy of interventions, efficiency of the mental health staff and also the redundancy of "unneeded" psychosocial interventions. Thus it was interesting to assess the effect of this amendment on rates of discharges from the military.
For reasons of national security, it is prohibited to disclose any figures from which military activities or manpower estimations may be reconstructed. Therefore, data on release from the military after SIBs are given as rates (ratios between number of SIBs and number of discharges) rather than actual numbers. In Table 1 , one can see the rates of release from the military following SIBs. The change in discharge rates following the change in policy between periods and between prisons was not significant (c 2 between periods = 0.594, ns; c 2 between prisons = 0.66, ns). However, it should be noted that our analyses lacked adequate statistical power and this might have been the reason for these final results. The statistical power of these final comparisons reached 60%, and only a larger sample could have resulted in significant differences (as our data inform us on large effects alone).
Discussion
This study was designed to examine the effect of a specific change of regulations in the Israeli military prison-the introduction of immediate and direct access to a psychiatrist for inmates who commit SIBs. Three major points arose from our findings: the rate of SIBs increased following the change of policy, this increase was limited to Prison B, and the change in policy did not have any statistically significant effect on the rate of discharge from the military following suicide attempts. These results suggest that the change in policy may have induced a behavioural change. Thus the change in policy may have resulted in an unwanted effect-an increase in the amount of (potentially) manipulative SIBs.
Military Service as a Stressful Period
Military service in the IDF is obligatory according to law. Although service in the IDF is perceived by most of the Israeli youth as a privilege, for many it can be a stressful and traumatic period. While in the middle of a struggle for independence and trying to detach from the early attachments of childhood, the young soldier finds himself under demands for obedience and submission to a hierarchic system. 28 Many of the young soldiers have to part from their families and social frameworks while facing problems in the family and in their social lives, such as financial difficulties or romantic disappointments. Israeli adolescents are forced to end their "psychosocial moratorium" 28 when recruited to the IDF, which gives structured and precise answers to many of the questions that preoccupy adolescents. This unique encounter can clearly lead to a crisis situation, which may be expressed through disciplinary problems, problems with authority figures, behavioural difficulties, and so on. These phenomena can end in negative reactions by the military system, such as punishment, including imprisonment, and may stimulate the distressed soldier to strive to get an easy discharge from the military by any possible means.
SIBs as a Reinforced Behaviour Pattern
The rate of SIBs in the 2 military prisons of the IDF is much higher than the rate in the general military population, but this difference is not due to a higher level of major psychopathology in incarcerated individuals committing such acts. According to internal reports of the IDF's mental health department, among those who committed SIBs while in military prisons, 13% were diagnosed before their imprisonment as suffering from psychopathology, compared with 11.32% of the soldiers that committed SIBs in the general military population (Bodner, personal communication). As reported previously, 22, 29 most SIBs include only minor physical injury as nearly all the self-harm acts committed by the present sample ended in no harm or in minor physical injury as defined by the attending physician. This outcome of SIBs, combined with the low rate of psychopathology, supports the notion that manipulation of the system is an important motivation for these SIBs. Several studies define manipulative SIBs as a kind of operant behaviour that is reinforced by situational changes that follow them. 22, 29 These studies assumed that, if a behaviour is reinforced by situational changes, the individual would repeat this behaviour in the future as a strategy to cope with similar problems. These researchers suggest that those who deliver the reinforcement do it unintentionally (that is, without being aware of their influence on this behaviour).
The Psychiatric Evaluation as a Reinforcement for SIB
The present study suggests that a behavioural reinforcement for SIB was inadvertently introduced by the new regulation implemented in Israeli military prisons. Mental health officers (mostly social workers) are relatively available to serve inmates on request and are qualified to help them overcome their emotional (and sometimes practical) difficulties by using both psychotherapy skills and comprehensive knowledge of the military system. However, it is possible that, from the inmates' perspective, especially for individuals seeking discharge from the military, mental health officers may not be the best choice of professional authority to approach, for 2 reasons. First, mental health officers cannot directly recommend discharge from the military. If, in their professional opinion, an individual should not continue his service, they must refer the individual to a psychiatrist, who is the only authority that decides on such issues. Second, mental health officers are (mostly) professional military officers and part of the prison's staff. Therefore, for inmates, it is possible that mental health officers represent the same system that punished them and the same system from which they are trying to escape.
The accessibility of inmates to a psychiatrist is relatively limited, and constrained to referrals from the mental health officer. However, inmates may consider an appointment with a psychiatrist advantageous, compared with an appointment with a mental health officer, for the same reasons that they devalue (subjectively) the mental health officer: a psychiatrist can recommend a release from the military, and most psychiatrists are civilians working part time for the military and therefore are not so strongly identified with the military system.
This change in policy opened a new venue for inmates of IDF prisons to receive immediate appointments with a psychiatrist, bypassing the need for a referral from a mental health officer by performing an act of self-injury. Because an appointment with a psychiatrist could be perceived as a positive reinforcement, the change in policy may have had an effect in increasing inmates' motivation to perform such acts.
Analogously, for many borderline patients with chronic suicidality, hospitalization is a double-edged sword. When these patients are admitted, they enter an environment that reinforces the very behaviours that therapy is trying to extinguish. 30 Most clinicians recognize the scenario in which a patient with borderline personality disorder escalates suicidal or self-mutilating behaviours in the hospital. One of the mechanisms that account for this phenomenon is the function of the environment of a psychiatric ward as a reinforcer, because patients who cut themselves or carry out parasuicidal actions receive more, not less, nursing care. Thus these patients attempt to manipulate the system to get attention and engage in self-injury. Therefore, the hospitalization of borderline patients with suicidal ideation has been seriously questioned by pointing out that its value is based on a clinical consensus rather than data coming from controlled clinical trials. Hospitalization may lead to regression, reinforcement of SIBs, "psychiatrization," and reduced quality of life.
The Effect of Imprisonment Conditions on Motivation for SIB
The fact that the change in policy made a difference only in Prison B but not in Prison A is intriguing. However, the population of the 2 prisons was not similar. Prison A serves mainly individuals sentenced for longer imprisonment, and thus it is possible to assume that many of the Prison A inmates had the possibility of coming to terms with their situation. In contrast, the inmates incarcerated in Prison B are either short-term prisoners or individuals awaiting trial. Both of these populations may be less adapted to the jail situation, and the last population may also be experiencing stress related to an unclear future. Accordingly, the possibility to get immediate access to a psychiatrist who can make a recommendation that will have a major effect on their immediate future (release from the military) may look extremely appealing to such populations. Therefore, these prisoners may be willing to invest a lot of effort in achieving it, including performing SIBs. The higher rate of SIBs in Prison B is concordant with reports in the literature that maintain that pretrial prisoners have the highest suicide risk within the total prison population. 20
The Effects of Increased SIBs on Rates of Discharge
If indeed one of the motivations for SIBs is to get an appointment with a psychiatrist and to get a recommendation for an early discharge from prison and from the military, the data from the present study indicate that the inmates' perceptions of this possibility may be wrong. Nevertheless, it is possible that the change in psychiatric accessibility is by itself reinforcement. The fact that rates of release from the military remained constant across the 2 periods may indicate that the elimination of the intermediate phase of interview by a mental health officer and the increase in SIBs rate did not have any effect on the final decisions made by psychiatrists. It is possible that psychiatrists do not regard SIBs in the context of the military prison as reflecting serious psychopathology, thus explaining the lack of change in discharges. 
Methodological Limitations
A limitation of the current study is the lack of measures examining the individual motivations of inmates to commit SIBs. However, the assumption that the SIBs increase was due to the inmates' motivation to get an easy discharge from the military through the psychiatric examination has some face validity and is supported qualitatively by the authors' clinical experience with inmates who committed SIBs. Also, we might have found that the effect of the policy change on the rates of SIBs and discharge changed over time, if we had followed the trends for a longer period of time. Additionally, we have to acknowledge that, even for the time period studied, other confounding factors, such as possible changes in daily routines of the prison, internal changes in the report of SIBs, changes in milieu, and unknown factors, could have caused the increase in SIBs frequency.
Another shortcoming of the study arises from the specific setting of military prisons, and our results cannot be generalized to civilian prisons, where the circumstances and the conditions of imprisonment are different. Compared with the military inmates in our study, who were convicted for short imprisonment periods, civilian prisons usually house individuals with longer sentences. 31 In addition, applying the results to military prisons in other militaries might be problematic because military service in most Western countries is voluntary.
Practical Recommendations
Despite the partial external validity of our study, it presents the effect of a policy change in a closed environment, and we believe that our findings do have relevance for SIB epidemiology and etiology.
The change in regulations introducing a mandatory and immediate appointment with a psychiatrist for each prisoner who carried out SIBs resulted in increased motivation for inmates to perform such acts. This increase may have been more relevant for subpopulations of inmates sentenced for shorter jail terms or still awaiting trial. Accordingly, it is possible that reconsideration of the new policy, with a return to the previous method where a mental health officer first interviews the inmates, may be required. Such a change may result in the return of SIBs levels to the previous lower numbers. This possibility is now under consideration by the IDF.
Another way to decrease the motivation for SIBs among inmates as a means to achieve an examination by a psychiatrist will be through a change in the psychiatrists' image as an external agent for the inmates. Reserve psychiatrists can be taught about behavioural influences that work on inmates' behaviour in the military prison. An instruction for reserve psychiatrists to work in uniform might also contribute to their image as internal agents. Also, the finding that the increases in SIBs had no effect on discharge rates may be brought to the inmates' attention. Knowing this fact might change their belief that self-harm can be a way to get an easy discharge from the military and decrease this behaviour.
Finally, the new policy was meant to increase the assessment of potentially suicidal individuals by senior psychiatrists at an earlier phase. However, this policy change served as a double-edged sword because it increased the rate of nonfatal SIBs in one of the prisons. Ways for reducing SIBs in prisons are required, and more research is mandatory within this vulnerable population. [32] [33] [34] Résumé : Résultats : La fréquence des CAM s'est accrue significativement après l'entrée en vigueur de la réglementation dans une prison, mais pas dans l'autre. Aucun effet n'a été observé sur le taux des libérations du service ou sur la gravité des blessures.
Conclusions : L'accessibilité accrue à un psychiatre pour des prisonniers militaires peut avoir résulté en une motivation accrue pour les détenus d'exécuter des CAM. Ces effets sont limités à la prison qui renferme une proportion plus élevée de soldats extrêmement stressés.
